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INTRODUCTION 
In February 2012, the District Court for the Southern District of California heard 
Tilikum v. Sea World, a landmark case for animal legal defense.1 The organization People 
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) filed a suit as next friends2 of five orca whales 
demanding their freedom from the marine wildlife entertainment park known as 
SeaWorld.3 The plaintiffs—Tilikum, Katina, Corky, Kasatka, and Ulises—were wild born 
and captured to perform at SeaWorld’s Shamu Stadium.4 They sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief for being held by SeaWorld in violation of slavery and involuntary 
servitude provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment.5 It was the first court in U.S. history to 
consider arguments that slavery does not apply exclusively to humans.6 The court held that 
as a matter of first impression, the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition on slavery and 
involuntary servitude applied only to humans, and thus whales lacked Article III standing 
under the U.S. Constitution to bring action against Sea World under the Thirteenth 
Amendment.7 
                                                          
1  See Jennifer O’Connor, The Case Forever Known as Tilikum v. SeaWorld, PEOPLE FOR ETHICAL TREATMENT ANIMALS (Feb. 
9, 2012), http://www.peta.org/blog/case-forever-known-tilikum-v-seaworld/#ixzz3Ib8EORe8/. 
2  Since the orcas’ rights could not be effectively vindicated except through an appropriate human representative, PETA 
and several individuals brought this action on behalf of the animals as “Next Friends” pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b), 
(c), which states that a next friend appears in court in place of another who is not competent to do so, usually because 
they are a minor or are considered incompetent. 
3  PETA brought suit as next friends under rule 17, which allows a third party to sue on behalf of the interests of the 
real party in interest. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1), (c)(2). This meant that the five orcas were the only plaintiffs, not PETA—
a revolutionary move for animal legal defense at the time. See O’Connor, supra note 1. 
4  See Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Entm’t, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 
2d 1259, 1260 (S.D. Cal. 2012). 
5  Id.  
6  See O’Connor, supra note 1.  
7  See Tilikum, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1264. 
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With this holding, the court added the following caveat: “[it] is not to say that 
animals have no legal rights; as there are many state and federal statutes affording redress 
to Plaintiffs, including, in some instances, criminal statutes that ‘punish those who violate 
statutory duties that protect animals.’”8 This caveat indicates law that understands and 
recognizes a place for animals is a rising trend in the United States; in fact, federal courts 
have seen a surge in animal law cases.9 Competing ideologies of welfarism and liberation 
structure the debate and the implications of litigation of animal rights: welfarists are those 
who seek to minimize the needless suffering of animals, but who ultimately sanction the 
use of animals for human use, while liberationists seek to expand full legal rights to animals 
and find it unacceptable for humans to use animals like property.10 Thus, claims span from 
recovery for emotional distress for lost pets in tort11 to arguing for legal personhood of 
animals under the law.12  
The movement towards rights for animals has relied upon borrowed language from 
other contemporaneous movements, namely the cause for abolition of slaves and, later, for 
civil rights. Other movements have sought to mobilize human empathy and concern for 
those oppressed and marginalized by systematic violence in order to correct society-wide 
ignorance, suffering, and injustice. Framing Tilikum and Company’s captivity as that of an 
enslaved being sought to awaken both the law and society to his capacity to suffer and to 
his entitlement to be free from suffering—much like the abolitionist movements sought to 
deconstruct the brutalization of slaves and sinful practice of slavery.13 However, this 
reliance becomes problematic when considering the implications: the animal rights 
movement seems to “humanize” animals, while the abolitionist movement and its legacy 
aimed to humanize humans. The thought that some animals deserve the humanization 
that has been denied to other minorities raises the risk of perpetuating dehumanizing 
strategies against minorities, namely former black slaves for whom the abolitionist 
discourse was initially developed. In other words, if a former slave and a donkey may be 
entitled to the same kinds of legal protection under the law, does that elevate the status of 
the donkey, demote the status of the person, both, or neither? The pains of both groups 
may be deplorable and relatable, but the legal mechanics of alleviating these issues cannot 
                                                          
8  Id.  
9  See generally Animal Legal & Historical Ctr., Animal Legal & Historical Center, MICH. ST. U.C.L., 
http://animallaw.info/#cases (last visited May 16, 2016) (chronicling many animal law cases). 
10  See Brittany J. Mouzourakis, Tilikum’s Splash: Lessons Learned from Animal Rights-Based Litigation Strategies, 10 J. 
ANIMAL & NAT. RESOURCE L. 223, 223–24 (2014). 
11  See Damages for Death or Injury of an Animal, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, http://aldf.org/resources/when-your-
companion-animal-has-been-harmed/damages-for-death-or-injury-of-an-animal/ (last visited May. 16, 2016).  
12  See Taimie L. Bryant, Sacrificing the Sacrifice of Animals: Legal Personhood for Animals, the Status of Animals As 
Property, and the Presumed Primacy of Humans, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 247, 247–48 (2008). 
13  See generally David W. Blight, Perceptions of Southern Intransigence and the Rise of Radical Antislavery Thought, 
1816–1830, 3 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 139 (1983).  
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be the same without potentially undoing a lot of the work done to advance the rights of 
humans formerly denied their humanity. 
This Note examines this flashpoint of the animal legal defense movement, the 
Tilikum case, including where it can be seen, how, and why anthropocentric strategies in 
liberating animals may fail. The animal litigation movement, while deeply embedded in 
other human-centered social movements like that of civil rights, has to carve out a novel 
approach to nonhuman legal protection that recognizes their unique role in society. I will 
begin with the history of the animal rights movement and its linkages to anthropocentric 
movements, then analyze the legal development and outcome of Tilikum. I will describe 
what is left in Tilikum’s wake and propose some ideas on innovative nonhuman legal 
recognition today. 
 
I. BACKGROUND: THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
Prior to the 18th century, animals were considered automatons without the capacity 
for cognition or feeling.14 Understanding of the suffering of animals expanded in the 18th 
century.15 The animal rights movement fully began in early 19th Century England, “where 
it grew alongside the humanitarian current that advanced human rights, including the anti-
slavery movement and later the movement for women’s suffrage.”16 In 1824, an act was 
passed to prevent cruelty to animals like horses and cattle, and the Royal Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) was founded to enforce it.17 In 1866, an American 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) was formed in New York, at first 
as a shelter for horses and livestock, then later for dogs, cats, and other smaller animals.18 
Around the country, other groups followed suit in opening shelters and seeking to enforce 
animal cruelty laws.19 These organizations were often spurred on by abolitionists, and 
provided protective services for both animals and children.20 In the 1890s, the anti-
vivisection movement began in England and the U.S. and was a campaign that sought to 
regulate the use of animals in scientific research and experimentation in Great Britain, as 
                                                          
14  This was the infamous understanding of Descartes; his and others’ indirect theories of animal ethics denied animals 
moral status or equal consideration with humans due to a lack of consciousness, reason, or autonomy; however, 
these theories still might have required not harming animals, but only because doing so caused harm to a human 
being’s morality. See Scott D. Wilson, Animals and Ethics, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).  
15  Jeremy Bentham, in particular, first asserted the rights of animals with authority and persistence: “The right question 
for animals is not ‘Can they reason?’ or ‘Can they talk?’, but [rather,]’can they suffer?’ These questions provide the 
fundamental concepts for animal welfare.” History of the Movement, WORLD ANIMAL NET, 
http://www.worldanimal.net/documents/3_Movement_History.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).  
16  David Walls, Animal Rights Movement, SONOMA ST. U., http://www.sonoma.edu/users/w/wallsd/animal-rights-
movement.shtml (last updated Nov. 9, 2014). 
17  See id.  
18  ASPCA Policy and Position Statements: History, ASPCA, http://www.aspca.org/about-us/aspca-policy-and-position-
statements/history (last visited May 16, 2016). 
19  See Walls, supra note 16; id. 
20  Walls, supra note 16. 
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medical institutions often relied on animals for experiments that were lethal, painful, and 
cruel.21 The movement eventually sought prohibition of animal experimentation by 
advocating legislation, education and public awareness, and alternative research 
methods.22 Although efforts to protect animals continued during this time, as seen with the 
passage of legislation like the Cruelty to Animals Act, this movement was quickly obscured 
by the rising prestige of modern medicine.23 However, concern for animals for the most 
part shifted instead to preserving wildlife.24 
 The end of World War II substantially altered the social fabric of America. One of 
the results of this shift was the rise in companion animals and pet keeping;25 the ideological 
controversy that developed caused a split between the American Humane Association 
(AHA) and the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) in the ‘50s and ‘60s.26 It was 
at this time that the groups managed a boom in legislation favorable to animals, including 
the Humane Slaughter Act and the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act.27 
 At this point in the animal rights movement, there was a shift away from the indirect 
ethical theories like “sentimentalism” and utilitarianism that had promoted animal rights.28 
These motivations were still anthropocentric, where human moral value and agency 
remained superior to that of animals. Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation mobilized the “new 
animal rights movement,” popularizing the concept of “speciesism” as a parallel to racism 
and sexism.29 Just as it is unacceptable for humans of a certain intelligence, race, or sex to 
abuse or use human beings of lesser intelligence, a different race or sex, it is unacceptable 
                                                          
21  Our History, AM. ANTI-VIVISECTION SOC’Y, http://aavs.org/about/history/ (last visited May 16, 2016). 
22  See id. 
23  Walls, supra note 16. 
24  See id. 
25  See id.  
26  See id.  
27  See id. “The Society for Animal Protective Legislation (SAPL) was established in 1955 to lobby for the first federal 
Humane Slaughter Act (passed in 1958); together with the Animal Welfare Institute also under the direction of 
Christine Stevens, SAPL has lobbied for every important piece of animal legislation since, including the Laboratory 
Animal Welfare Act (1966), the Endangered Species Act (1969), the Horse Protection Act (1970), the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act (1972) and their various subsequent extensions and strengthening amendments.” Id.  
28  “Sentimentalism refers to a philosophy grounded in emotional concern to act in moral fashion; in other words, 
individuals rely on their emotions to inform their motivations and moral decisions. On the other hand, utilitarianism 
determines the moral rightness or wrongness of an act by whether or not it maximizes preference satisfaction or, in 
other words, the satisfaction of interests. If the value of an act outweighs the evil of the act, then its moral rightness 
can be justified without consideration of emotion.” See Monica L. Gerrek, Normative Sentimentalism and Animal 
Ethics (Dec. 7, 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas), 
https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/3984/umi-ku-
2289_1.pdf;jsessionid=A976870A2534376620E08D4C6423C1A3?sequence=1. 
29  The “speciesism objection” forwarded by Singer responded to the utilitarian idea that animals do not deserve equal 
consideration because they are not humans and, thus, they and their interests are inferior, so humans have a right 
to treat them as they please. Id. at 5. Singer likens our treatment of animals “in virtue of the fact that they are of a 
different species to the treatment of non-whites and females because they are not white or male.” He argues against 
“speciesism” as a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of one’s own species and against those of 
members of other species. Id. at 153–54. 
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for humans to abuse or use members of other species.30 Singer’s point is that if intelligence, 
race, or sex is not a good enough reason to permit harm to members of our own species, 
then species is likewise an insufficient reason to harm members of other species.31 Tom 
Regan took the work of Singer even further, moving beyond the idea of animal welfare to 
argue the case for animal rights in the natural rights tradition.32 Instead of simply avoiding 
harm to animals because it is morally repugnant or because it is an imbalance of utilities, 
Regan advocated that animals, like humans, have rights and that the possession of these 
rights by animals ought to dictate our actions toward them.33 Public demonstrations, 
protests, and petitions were organized in the wake of this evolving literature.34 
Additionally, releasing and removing animals from laboratories, zoos, or factory farms; 
sabotaging of hunting, laboratories, and breed establishments; and other demonstrations 
have continued controversially since the 1970s.35  
 Similar to many movements of the era, the nonhuman animal rights movement 
began to professionalize and adopt other organizational models.36 For example, in 1979, 
Joyce Tischler founded the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF), using Thurgood Marshall’s 
Legal Defense Fund of the NAACP as a model.37 In order for groups like the ALDF to 
increase their political influence and mobilize strength, they began to moderate tactics and 
goals.38 By the 1990s, most nonhuman animal rights organizations seemed to resemble one 
another in structure and repertoire,39 and welfare reform became standard protocol. 
Organizations found themselves pushing for regulations that promised to improve 
efficiency and productivity for exploitative industries without radically ending or altering 
them—considerable trade-offs that troubled many advocates.40 
 The welfare reform movement does seem to maintain the status quo, more or less. 
Under the current laws, animals are considered property, and as such, they are afforded no 
legal rights in American society.41 Although there have been a few unique instances in 
                                                          
30  Id. at 153–54. 
31  Id.  
32  Walls, supra note 16. 
33  Gerreck, supra note 28, at 141. 
34  History of the Movement, supra note 15, at 4. 
35  See Walls, supra note 16, at 4.  
36  Corey Lee Wrenn, Abolition Then and Now: Tactical Comparisons Between the Human Rights Movement and the 
Modern Nonhuman Animal Rights Movement in the United States, 26 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 3, 4 (2013). 
37  Jeff Pierce, ALDF’s Animal Law Institute Looks Back Across Four Years of Strategic Efforts, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND: 
BLOG (Nov. 5, 2014), http://aldf.org/blog/aldfs-animal-law-institute-looks-back-across-four-years-of-strategic-
efforts/. 
38  Wrenn, supra note 36, at 4. 
39  Id.  
40  Id; see also The Case for Controlled-Atmosphere Killing, PEOPLE FOR ETHICAL TREATMENT ANIMALS, 
http://www.peta.org/features/case-controlled-atmosphere-killing/ (last visited May 16, 2016) (exemplifying the 
welfarist approach to animal rights that still perpetuates slaughter). 
41  See, e.g., Sentell v. New Orleans & C.R. Co., 166 U.S. 698, 701 (1897) (holding that domestic animals are perfect 
property and wild animals are property upon capture). 
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which animals have sued in their own name and right,42 the majority of litigation 
surrounding the animal advocacy movement involves animal advocacy organizations suing 
to enforce animal protective statutes that enhance the welfare of animals.43 Generally, these 
lawsuits are brought under the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA)44 
or under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA)45 through Section 70246 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).47 That is not to say that these acts were great examples of legislative 
progress for animal welfare, though. The ESA is one of the most extensive and restrictive 
regulations for the preservation of national and global species, imposing strict penalties for 
the killing and harassment of protected animals and their habitats.48 The AWA mandates 
various regulations to improve the living conditions of captive animals.49 Congress enacted 
the AWA “to insure that animals intended for use in research facilities or for exhibition 
purposes or for use as pets are provided humane care and treatment.”50 The statute tasks 
the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) with promulgating rules, 
regulations, and orders necessary to carry out the provisions of the AWA.51 The regulations 
promulgated under the AWA that are most relevant to this Note are those regulations that 
deal with humane living conditions for exhibition animals.52 
Like the Civil Rights Movement, the animal rights movement experienced a 
splintering into factions by the early 2000s as activists became frustrated with the political 
stagnancy by moderation. Gary Francione spearheaded the formation of what he called the 
“abolitionist approach to animal rights.”53 His writings criticized the shortcomings of the 
                                                          
42  See, e.g., Palila v. Haw. Dep’t. of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining in dicta that “the 
[Palila, a type of bird,] . . . has legal status . . . as a plaintiff in its own right”). 
43  See, e.g., Am. Soc’y for Prev. of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 335 
(D.C. Cir. 2003); Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
44  See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1534 (2012). Addressing the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 1540(g), is outside the scope of this Article because the orca species, as a whole, is not classified as an 
endangered or threatened species according to 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2015). 
45  7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2012). 
46  See generally 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”). 
47  For a deeper discussion on welfare-based animal litigation strategies, see, for example, Karina L. Schrengohst, Animal 
Law—Cultivating Compassionate Law: Unlocking the Laboratory Door and Shining Light on the Inadequacies & 
Contradictions of the Animal Welfare Act, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 855 (2011). 
48  See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Endangered Species Act Lessons Over 30 Years, and the Legacy of the Snail Darter, a Small 
Fish in a Porkbarrel, 34 ENVTL. L. 289, 290–91 (2004).  
49  See 7 U.S.C. § 2131. 
50  Id. § 2131(1). 
51  See id. § 2151. 
52  Animals in captivity must be provided with sufficient space for “adequate freedom of movement.” 9 C.F.R. § 3.128 
(2016). Inadequate living space can be evidenced by stress or abnormal behavioral patterns. See id. There is no citizen 
suit provision of the AWA; however, litigants can enforce provisions of the AWA by bringing suit under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012); see also, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 
F.3d 426, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting plaintiffs believed primates’ deplorable living conditions violated the Animal 
Welfare Act and sued through the Administrative Procedure Act). 
53  See Gary L. Francione, Some Thoughts on the Abolitionist Approach, ABOLITIONIST APPROACH (Oct. 24, 2009), 
http:// www.abolitionistapproach.com/some-thoughts-on-the-abolitionist-approach.  
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“compromised” movement; renounced the effectiveness of professionalized groups bound 
to organizational maintenance and hesitant to challenge exploitative industries; and 
accused the movement of failing in general to address the property status of nonhuman 
animals, even reinforcing commodification through “regulationist” and “welfarist” 
measures.54 Francione’s abolitionist approach, then, calls for recognition of the personhood 
of animals and the equal consideration of their interests based on their self-awareness and 
capacity to suffer.55 
The organizational tactics of the previous decade’s Civil Rights Era and other human 
rights movements affirmed and heavily influenced this aggressive mobilization of the 
animal rights movement. The discourse of the animal rights movement, like that in the 
Civil Rights Movement, began to reference groups of powerful individuals oppressing and 
exploiting weaker individuals; overt and subtle acts of systematic violence by the dominant 
against the marginalized; and the ignorance and apathy of social or institutional bystanders 
that can exacerbate the injustice.56 Discussion of the intersectionality of inequalities 
underscored the movement previously,57 namely in the work of Marjorie Spiegel and her 
1988 book, The Dreaded Comparison,58 but Francione brought it to forefront:  
 
[W]e cannot make meaningful distinctions between the quality of sentient experiences 
between humans and nonhumans that would justify imposing any pain and suffering on 
nonhumans incidental to our use of them as our resources, any more than we can make such 
distinctions between or among humans for the purpose of justifying slavery or otherwise 
treating humans exclusively as resources.59 
 
Francione also identified the parallel between the two movements in that the “fundamental 
interests of sentient beings are commodified and treated as tradable depending on 
economic consequences.”60 This view creates many tactical similarities between the two 
movements in emphasizing the use of graphic imagery, narratives, and other depictions of 
suffering in motivating participation.61 Participation in both movements is also paralleled 
                                                          
54  See id; see also Wrenn, supra note 36, at 2; see generally GARY L. FRANCIONE & ROBERT GARNER, THE ANIMAL RIGHTS 
DEBATE: ABOLITION OR REGULATION? 1–4 (2010).  
55  FRANCIONE & GARNER, supra note 54, at 14–24. 
56  Carter Dillard, Is the Animal Rights Movement Civil Rights 2.0? ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND: BLOG (July 23, 2013), 
http://aldf.org/blog/.is-the-animal-rights-movement-civil-rights-2-0/. 
57  Writing in 1898, activist Henry Salt compared “the present condition . . . of domestic animals . . . to that of the negro 
slaves of a 100 years ago: . . . [there is] the same exclusion from the common pale of humanity; the same hypocritical 
fallacies, to justice that exclusion; and, as a consequence, the same deliberate stubborn denial of their social ‘rights.’” 
Wrenn, supra note 36. 
58  Spiegel claims that, like slavery, the exploitation of animals is invisible and aided by a belief that animals are inferior 
and naturally intended to be dominated and consumed. Spiegel posits this mindset that de-stigmatizes and alienates 
what could be an extension of the values that enabled exploitation of other, “inferior” human beings. MARJORIE 
SPIEGEL, THE DREADED COMPARISON: HUMAN AND ANIMAL SLAVERY 15–32 (1997).  
59  FRANCIONE & GARNER, supra note 54, at 24–25.  
60  Id. at 229.  
61  See Elizabeth L. DeCoux, Speaking for the Modern Prometheus: The Significance of Animal Suffering to the Abolitionist 
Movement, 16 ANIMAL L. R. 9 (2009). 
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through use of tactics like nonviolent and violent direct action and social resistance; 
commercial abstention; media campaigning; economic, political, and moral suasion; 
legislative efforts; and legal action.  
 
II. TILIKUM’S LEGAL STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS  
Tilikum was captured off the coast of Iceland at the age of two and sold to Sealand 
of the Pacific in 1984, where Tilikum performed for seven years.62 In 1991, Tilikum was sold 
to SeaWorld after killing a trainer.63 In 1999, Tilikum was again suspected of violence when 
a man who broke into the park was found dead in his tank; whether Tilikum pulled him in 
or he jumped is uncertain.64 It wasn’t until 2010 that Tilikum’s behavior became infamous, 
when he killed a trainer during a show at SeaWorld Orlando.65 The drama spurred 
investigations by animal rights activists, namely Gabriela Cowperwaithe, who began the 
filming of the documentary Blackfish in order to learn the full story.66 Blackfish follows 
Tilikum’s capture, abuse in the parks, and behavior. It includes testimonials from biologists 
and former SeaWorld employees and trainers, who describe their experiences with Tilikum 
and other captive whales.67 Blackfish was released in 2013 at the Sundance Film Festival;68 
meanwhile, in 2011, PETA filed as “next friends” of Tilikum and other whales, a complaint69 
alleging SeaWorld violated the orcas’ Thirteenth Amendment rights70 to be free from 
slavery and involuntary servitude.71 According to the complaint, forced captivity of the 
whales had caused them to exhibit unnatural psychological and physical ailments: 
specifically, orcas develop aggressive behavior and die premature deaths due to their 
unnatural living conditions.72 As such, the orcas sought to enjoin SeaWorld from keeping 
                                                          
62  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 7, Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 
Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Ent, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 11-cv-02476 JM WMC) [hereinafter 
Complaint].  
63  See Jeffrey Kluger, Killer-Whale Tragedy: What Made Tilikum Snap, TIME (Feb. 26, 2010), http:// 
content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1968249,00.html (noting that Tilikum, along with two other whales, 
caused a trainer to drown during a performance).  
64  See Martin Evans, The Story Behind Tilikum the Killer Whale, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 26, 2010), http:// 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7322889/The-story-behind-Tilikum-the-killer-
whale.html. See also Kluger, supra note 63. 
65  See Kluger, supra note 63 (reporting that Tilikum jumped out of the water and grabbed the trainer’s ponytail and 
drowned her to death). 
66  See Eric Kohn, Sundance Interview: ‘Blackfish’ Director Gabriela Cowperthwaite Discusses Suffering Orcas, Trainer 
Death, and Why SeaWorld Hasn’t Seen the Movie, INDIEWIRE (Jan. 26, 2013), 
http://www.indiewire.com/article/sundance-interview-blackfish-director-gabriela-cowperthwaite-discusses-
suffering-orcas-trainer-death-and-why-seaworld-hasnt-seen-the-movie.  
67  See id.  
68  David Roonet, Blackfish: Sundance Review, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Jan. 21, 2013), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/review/blackfish-sundance-review-414203.  
69  Complaint, supra note 62, at 1. By acting as next friends, PETA sought to structure the lawsuit in such a way that the 
orcas were attempting to sue in their own legal right. Id. at 2.  
70  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States.”). 
71  See Complaint, supra note 62, at 1. 
72  Id. at 5. On average, both male and female captive orcas live 8.5 years in captivity; in comparison, male orcas can live 
up to 60 years in the wild and female orcas can live up to 90 years in the wild. Id. 
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them captive and forcing them to perform.73 The orcas also requested that the court 
appoint a guardian to facilitate their release from SeaWorld.74 Not only did the case cause 
a media wildfire, but PETA’s litigation strategy also departed from traditional strategies 
that animal advocacy organizations commonly use to litigate animal issues:75 PETA raised 
a constitutional claim, listed the orcas as the plaintiffs, and sued as next friends.76 
Instead of relying on the standard animal welfare litigation acts like the Animal 
Welfare Act (AWA) or the Endangered Species Act (ESA), PETA relied upon a 
constitutional claim in the case, arguing the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of 
slavery also applied to nonhuman animals.77 If PETA was successful on this challenge, orca 
whales like Tilikum would receive constitutional protection.78 Additionally, if PETA had 
used a traditional, animal welfare-based litigation strategy (for example, presenting a claim 
that stipulated the continued confinement of the orcas was acceptable pending certain 
improvements in their keeping),79 the outcome could have resulted in more “humane” 
living conditions for the orcas, rather than complete freedom or legal rights; thus, the 
decision to bring a claim under the Constitution was aimed at achieving the animal right’s 
objective of “extending rights to animals” and liberating them of their inferior legal status. 
Unlike in previous animal welfare litigation claims under the AWA or ESA, the only 
plaintiffs listed were the whales themselves.80 Usually AWA cases only require that human 
plaintiffs, not the nonhuman animals, show they have standing by showing a cognizable 
injury in fact—not whether the animals themselves had standing in their own right to raise 
the AWA claims.81 Further, although claims under the ESA usually list the endangered 
species as plaintiffs, advocacy organizations are also listed.82 Courts then only have to 
                                                          
73  See Complaint, supra note 62, at 20. 
74  See id.  
75  See, e.g., Mouzourakis, supra note 10, at 231. 
76  See Complaint, supra note 62, at 1.  
77  See id. at 17–20. 
78  See id. at 20. 
79  Examples of welfare-based litigation under the AWA or the ESA can be seen in Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 
154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (alleging that human plaintiff suffered aesthetic injuries by observing isolated primates 
deprived of enrichment or companionship), and Am. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. & 
Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (alleging that a circus employee suffered aesthetic injuries in 
observing Asian elephants being beaten with bullhooks and chained to hard surfaces).  
80  Complaint, supra note 62, at 1–2. 
81  Mouzourakis, supra note 10, at 238–39; e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund, 154 F.3d 426 (plaintiffs were not isolated, non-
human primates in zoo; rather, plaintiffs were humans alleging aesthetic injuries due to viewing non-human 
primates living in isolated conditions).  
82  E.g., Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Nat. Res., 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (primary plaintiff was the bird 
itself, but it was accompanied by plaintiffs the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society, the Hawaii Audubon 
Society, and Alan C. Ziegler). 
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determine if one of the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit; usually, the standing 
analysis in those cases focused on the organization’s standing, not that of the species.83  
Interestingly, Tilikum is not the only case that employed this plaintiff-listing 
strategy for whales. A 2004 case from the Ninth Circuit involved the entire cetacean 
community (whales, dolphins, and porpoises) suing President George W. Bush for 
authorizing the Navy to use sonar equipment that allegedly violated various federal 
environmental statutes.84 This move was based on another Ninth Circuit case from 198885 
which announced in the opinion, “[a bird]…has legal status and wings its way into federal 
court as a plaintiff in its own right.”86 The court held such a statement to be merely 
“nonbinding dicta.”87 
PETA’s resurrection of this strategy—emphasizing the premise that animals can sue 
in their own name and right—is critical under an animal rights-based objective because it 
establishes a nonhuman animal’s legal claim can be independent from a human’s injury.88 
PETA did make one final unique move in their presentation of the case by suing as next 
friends of the orcas,89 which had never before been used in animal litigation.90 Relying on 
next friend status was another groundbreaking test litigation strategy by PETA to 
determine the viability of such a tool in the future for animal rights litigation.91 The tool 
was arguably necessary though, based on the inherent inability of Tilikum and his 
podmates to sue SeaWorld in the same capacity as humans; the reliance on next friend 
status thus is representative of animals’ true status in the law. 
  
                                                          
83  Mouzrakis, supra note 10, at 238–239; see also, e.g., Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 1998) (listing 
the Environmental Protection Information Center also as a named plaintiff); Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 
954 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992) (listing the Sierra Club also as a named plaintiff).  
84  Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004). 
85  See Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Nat. Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). 
86  Id. at 1107. The statement was controversial among the courts, as it seemed to grant standing to animals suing under 
the ESA, while others read it as nonbinding dicta. E.g., Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343, 
1346 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Thus, as a protected species under the ESA, the marbled murrelet has standing to sue ‘in its 
own right.’”) (quoting Palila, 852 F.2d at 1107); Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. New England 
Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Mass. 1993); see also Mouzourakis, supra note 10, at 239–40. 
87  Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1173. 
88  Mouzourakis, supra note 10, at 240. 
89  See Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Entm’t, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 
2d 1259, 1260 (S.D. Cal. 2012). Next friend standing comes from Rule 17(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 
“[a] minor or an incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or 
by guardian ad litem.” It is often used in cases involving prisoners, minors, and mentally incompetent people. 
90  SeaWorld’s Reply to PETA’s Opposition to SeaWorld’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 9, Tilikum ex rel. People 
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Entm’t, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (S.D. Cal. 2012) 
(No. 3:11-cv-02476).  
91  Mouzourakis, supra note 10, at 240. 
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III. THE TILIKUM OPINION 
In response to the allegations of the plaintiffs, the defendant SeaWorld filed both a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and a motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction due to lack of standing on the part of the plaintiffs.92  
Preliminary requirements had to be met before the standing question was 
addressed: a plaintiff must first be (1) a legal person who (2) possesses a legal right and 
there must be (3) a private right of action.93 Under the Constitution, federal courts have 
subject matter jurisdiction over “cases” and “controversies.”94 According to the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,95 a case or controversy is present when the 
plaintiff demonstrates that: (1) the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and 
particularized and actual or imminent; (2) there is a causal connection between the 
conduct complained of and the injury in fact; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to speculative, 
that a favorable decision will redress the plaintiff’s injury. All three elements have 
historically been difficult for animal litigants to prove, although courts have broadened 
sufficient findings in recent years.96 If any element is missing from the claim, then the case 
will be dismissed due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
If constitutional standing can be proven, the next step for the plaintiff is to establish 
prudential standing, an additional set of requirements beyond Article III constitutional 
standing. Federal courts will not tolerate suits where “the asserted harm is a ‘generalized 
grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens”;97 rather, 
the harm must be “distinct and palatable”98 and reasonably within the “zone of interests” 
that the statute or constitutional provision in question was intended to protect.99  
The court in Tilikum analyzed in detail whether the Thirteenth Amendment applied 
to non-humans, examining the “plain and ordinary meaning of the Amendment, historical 
context, and judicial interpretations.”100 When the Thirteenth Amendment passed in 1865, 
                                                          
92  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), (6); see also Tilikum, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1261.  
93  Steven M. Wise, Legal Personhood and the Nonhuman Rights Project, 17 ANIMAL L. 1, 2 (2010). 
94  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The case-or-controversy limitation limits federal courts to “questions presented in an 
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). 
95  Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).  
96  See, e.g., Am. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. & Barnun & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 337 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding that the plaintiff could meet the injury in fact prong of the Lujan test because plaintiff had 
a close relationship with mistreated elephants and planned to continue to visit the elephants); id. at 337 (“[A]n injury 
in fact can be found when a defendant adversely affects a plaintiff’s enjoyment of flora or fauna, which the plaintiff 
wishes to enjoy again upon the cessation of the defendant’s actions.”); Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 
F.3d 426, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that aesthetic and emotional attachment to an animal can serve as an injury); 
see also Katherine Burke, Can We Stand for It? Amending the Endangered Species Act with an Animal-Suit Provision, 
75 U. COLO. L. REV. 633, 665 (2004). 
97  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
98  Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979). 
99  Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). 
100  Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Entm’t, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 
1259, 1262 (S.D. Cal. 2012).  
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slavery was understood to apply only to humans.101 The court noted that Abraham Lincoln’s 
contemporaneous Emancipation Proclamation explicitly mentioned persons when it freed 
slaves; therefore, the only reasonable interpretation of the language of the Amendment is 
that nonhuman animals like orcas were not considered “enslaved” under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which defines slavery as a uniquely human practice.102 PETA attempted to 
argue that rights within the Constitution can expand and change over time within the spirit 
of the Constitution.103 However, the court held that the Thirteenth Amendment, unlike the 
Fourteenth Amendment, cannot expand to protect nonhumans because it does not involve 
more flexible notions of “due process,” “equal protection,” or “cruel and unusual 
punishment,” which are “fundamental constitutional concepts subject to changing 
conditions and evolving norms of our society.”104 
Thus, the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the 
plaintiffs lacked redressability under their claim, which was required to have the proper 
standing defined by Article III of the Constitution; the court noted that “there is no 
likelihood of redress under the Thirteenth Amendment because the Amendment only 
applies to humans, and not orcas.”105 Regarding PETA’s use of next friend standing in the 
suit, however, the court concluded in a footnote that it did not reject such status solely 
because it was in relation to nonhumans;106 rather, the status was rejected because the orcas 
themselves did not have standing to bring a constitutional challenge in federal court.107 
This important distinction indicates that animal litigants may be able to bring claims using 
next friend standing to nonhuman animals in the future.  
 
IV. THE LEGACY OF TILIKUM FOR NONHUMAN RIGHTS  
 By dismissing the claim for lack of standing, the Tilikum decision indicates that 
courts are still reluctant to grant independent legal status to animals, especially since the 
Article III analysis was arguably misapplied to the plaintiffs in the case.108 The Tilikum 
decision also has precluded the chance for legal development in applying the analysis to 
                                                          
101  See id. at 1263.  
102  Id.  
103  O’Connor, supra note 1 (quoting legal scholar Laurence Tribe: “Ours is a vibrant Constitution, more than capable of 
warding off past evils while also speaking to circumstances in which we come to recognize that familiar principles 
apply in ways previously unforeseen. So it seems to me no abuse of the Constitution to invoke it on behalf of non-
human animals cruelly confined for purposes of involuntary servitude.”). 
104  Tilikum, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1264. 
105  Id.  
106  See id. at 1262 n.2. 
107  See id.  
108  The Tilikum court determined that the orcas did not have Article III standing because the orcas could not meet the 
redressability prong of the test; however, this confuses the redressability prong of the Lujan test with the plaintiffs’ 
inability to meet prudential standing requirements. The redressability prong of the Lujan test asks whether “the 
requested relief will redress the alleged injury,” not whether a plaintiff can meet prudential standing requirements. 
See Mouzourakis, supra note 10, at 243. 
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animal-plaintiffs in the future.109 Although the court did not even approach the issue, there 
is a likelihood that, had Article III standing been established, the court would have still 
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the orcas would not have had 
prudential standing: Tilikum’s claim is unlikely to be within the “zone of interests” of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, given its historical significance to the experience of black 
Americans and current understandings and prioritizations of civil and human rights.110  
In this sense, Tilikum embodied the conclusion that the parallel movements 
between civil rights and animal liberation will have immense difficulty coalescing. While 
independent legal standing and capacity is an appropriate goal for the animal rights/animal 
liberation movement, the law will struggle to fully construct personhood status for 
nonhuman animals equivalent to that of human animals. The goals and understandings of 
the animal rights movement cannot play “catch up” to the Civil Rights Movement; certain 
hierarchical gaps will remain, as the structure of the laws and society are constructed 
exclusively for humans. Furthermore, the inclusion of other humans in the social circle of 
equality has not fully been achieved; creating closer and closer parallels between animal 
rights and civil rights runs the risk of undermining the work that remains to be done for 
fellow humans.111 As the animal rights movement has slowly progressed over the past 
century, the appropriation of discourse and imagery from the Civil Rights Movement was 
helpful and legitimizing; however, as the implications of granting more consideration for 
animals demands altering their legal and social status, the parallels seem to splinter, and 
animal liberationists and welfarists alike must forge new forms of personhood. 
The nonhuman abolitionist movement has appropriated the human experience as a 
means of drawing attention to the similar manifestations of oppression in both instances; 
however, this appropriation could prove problematic in creating movement alliances, as it 
                                                          
109  “The orcas were seeking an injunction to enjoin SeaWorld from holding the orcas captive and requested specific 
performance for SeaWorld to release them from SeaWorld. The orcas’ alleged injury—that captivity causes the 
whales emotional and psychological distress that shortens their life expectancy—arguably would be redressed by 
releasing the orcas from captivity to a more ‘suitable habitat.’ The Tilikum court’s analysis of the redressability prong 
hinged on whether the Thirteenth Amendment applied to orcas, but it should have hinged on whether a ‘favorable 
decision’ would likely redress the orcas’ alleged injury. In this case, a favorable decision would have been that the 
Thirteenth Amendment applied to orcas, and that SeaWorld is enjoined from keeping the orcas as slaves or 
indentured servants. Because the redressability prong was met under the facts of this case, the Tilikum court should 
have then assessed the injury in fact and causation prongs of the Lujan test. The orcas’ claim easily meets the 
causation element because SeaWorld’s captivity of the orcas is causing them physical and emotional stress. Because 
the orcas arguably meet the redressability and causation prongs of the Lujan test, the Tilikum court would then need 
to determine if the orcas suffered an injury in fact to complete the Article III analysis. . . . . Determining that an 
animal-plaintiff, in its own right, can suffer an injury in fact of a legally cognizable interest would have been a great 
victory for the advancement of animal rights. After such a ruling, animal-plaintiffs subjected to poor living conditions 
would easily meet Article III standing requirements because the animal is the one who actually suffers the injury. . . 
. As such, had the Tilikum court appropriately analyzed the orcas’ standing, the court could have created precedent 
that advanced animal rights.” Id. at 243–44.  
110  See Risa L. Goluboof, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L. J. 1609, 1645 (2001). 
111  See, e.g., Jack Schlossberg, 50 Years Later, Civil Rights Struggle is Far From Over, CNN (Aug. 1, 2013, 1:27 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/01/opinion/schlossberg-voting-rights/.  
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often lacks sensitivity and can alienate many demographics; it is Spiegel’s “dreaded 
comparison” incarnate.112 In an interview with The Daily Show, activist Elaine Brown called 
PETA’s lawsuit “beyond insulting” and a “cruel and racist joke.”113 “Animal cruelty does not 
rise to slavery. . . . Part of the slave condition was that blacks were not really human 
beings.”114 In other words, because blacks were often compared to nonhumans as a means 
to dehumanize and otherize them to justify their oppression and discrimination, putting 
animal rights on the same level of concern as civil rights can cause tension between the two 
movements.115  
PETA has caught heat for similar comparisons between racial violence and animal 
cruelty before: in both 2005 and 2011, PETA unveiled exhibits called respectively, “Are 
Animals the New Slaves?”116 and “Glass Walls,”117 showing graphic pictures of lynchings, 
slavery, and the Holocaust alongside images of caged and slaughtered animals. The 
campaigns, although aimed at expanding the scope of concern and sense of justice for all, 
as well as speaking out against oppression “regardless of the race, gender, age, nationality 
or species of the victims,”118 teetered dangerously on the verge of utilizing black bodies as a 
sort of “cause currency,” dehumanizing the suffering of racial minorities in order to 
emphasize that of animals. 
Spiegel counters this reaction to the “dreaded comparison” in arguing that 
comparing human and nonhuman experiences is not to degrade the former but to elevate 
the latter: “Comparing the suffering of animals to that of blacks (or any other oppressed 
group) is offensive only to the speciesist: one who has embraced the false notions of what 
animals are like.”119 Other activists have similarly argued that this sense of offense arises 
from humans’ underlying notions of superiority to nonhumans.120 These activists have 
hoped to push understandings of moral concern to nonhumans on the basis of their 
sentience, self-awareness, and potential to suffer.121  
There are other considerations that could become problematic in determining the 
appropriateness of comparing the two groups, though, as human abolitionist activism and 
ending oppression of blacks extends beyond issues regarding property status and use, and 
                                                          
112  See Wrenn, supra note 36, at 179; see also SPIEGEL, supra note 58.  
113  The Daily Show: Episode #17058 Louise Slaughter, (Comedy Central television broadcast Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/wed-February-15-2012/seaworld-of-pain. 
114  Id. 
115  Wrenn, supra note 36.  
116  John P. Avlon, Opinion, PETA’s Animal Slavery Insanity, N.Y. SUN (Aug. 16, 2005), 
http://www.nysun.com/opinion/petas-animal-slavery-insanity/18661/. 
117  Danielle Wright, Another PETA Exhibit Compares Animal Cruelty to Slavery, BET.COM (Jul. 21, 2011), 
http://www.bet.com/news/national/2011/07/21/another-peta-exhibit-compares-animal-cruelty-to-slavery.html. 
118  Id. 
119  SPIEGEL, supra note 58, at 30. 
120  See KAREN DAVIS, THE HOLOCAUST AND THE HENMAID’S TALE: A CASE FOR COMPARING ATROCITIES, at xii (2005). 
121  Wrenn, supra note 36.  
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infiltrates many social institutions.122 The human civil rights movement has begun to 
address the aftermath of “liberation,” while the nonhuman rights movement has hardly 
contemplated the implications of such a consequence. Most importantly, the nature of 
nonhuman animals themselves undermines the comparison of the two liberationist 
movements. Animals cannot speak for themselves; thus, representations of their 
experiences and of their demands are never fully in their control. The Tilikum plaintiffs 
requested a guardian to determine their release from SeaWorld,123 but how can PETA know 
that this is the true relief sought? How can PETA establish that Tilikum and his podmates 
have any sense of the legal mechanism that would free them from the park? Additionally, 
animals are not and cannot be held to the same standard of moral agency as humans; if this 
were the case, Tilikum would not only be entitled to freedom from slavery, but also 
potentially accountable for the deaths caused during his time in captivity. The language of 
the Thirteenth Amendment provides that involuntary servitude is permissible if it is 
punishment for a crime;124 if PETA were truly willing to grant protection for the orcas under 
this constitutional provision, then it would seem that all the provision’s aspects would then 
apply to nonhumans, meaning animals could also be put on trial for their actions. Would 
that also mean animals had a right to vote under the Fifteenth Amendment?125  
The orca’s standing and status in this case is no doubt problematic, even 
preposterous, considering the current conceptions of animal sentience and self-awareness 
as well as the contextual significance of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery. 
It is possible that the litigation here was intentionally polarizing to garner increased 
attention and concern for the plight of the whales; with the most radical action taken, 
compromises and other smaller victories become more achievable. However, this strategy 
does not warrant disregarding the intersectionality and divergences of the nonhuman and 
human rights movement. Under the similar dynamics, claims-making, and tactics of the 
civil rights movement, the animal rights movement has pushed the ideology of concern 
and consideration to the point where extra sensitivity is now required and new trails must 
be wrought for societal and legal recognition and rights. Just because freedom for Tilikum 
is warranted does not mean that the abolition amendment should be stripped of its unique 
historical significance and taxied into the discourse of animal liberation. 
  
                                                          
122  For instance, after the failed efforts of the American Reconstruction era, civil rights efforts focused on deconstructing 
racism and segregation. More recently, the movement has challenged continued loss of power and personhood for 
African Americans as perpetuated by the American prison system and disadvantages for occupational, educational, 
and housing opportunities. Id.  
123  Complaint, supra note 62, at 20. 
124  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
125  U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”). 
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V. PROPOSED DIMENSIONS FOR NEW NONHUMAN LEGAL PERSONHOOD 
 Tilikum did offer new insights into the future of the animal rights movement on the 
ground as well as within the law. First, the litigation became another cog in the campaign 
engine that drove PETA’s cause against SeaWorld, symbolic of the social push to reform 
SeaWorld and liberate animals in the parks. Second, it also laid interesting new 
groundwork for future litigants hoping to establish animals as legal entities, inside and 
outside of the Constitution. 
 Although it was released a little over a year after the conclusion of the litigation, 
Blackfish was powerful fodder in PETA’s anti-SeaWorld campaign, vindicating the Tilikum 
lawsuit and its impact on orca advocacy. The documentary became salient because of its 
visually tangible evidence of the orcas’ injuries as a result of their captivity.126 PETA relied 
on the media attention garnered by Blackfish to push the SeaWorld agenda to more 
mainstream audiences.127 Impassioned supporters of freeing Tilikum took advantage of the 
raised awareness, publicly protesting SeaWorld events and speaking out against the 
corporation in new, creative ways,128 including creating leverage in conventional business 
strategies.129 In addition to the litigation, PETA sources its campaign to a variety of outlets: 
documentaries, social media, the Internet, newspapers and mainstream television, and live 
protests.130 The documentary also provided an influx of resources needed to put increased 
scrutiny on SeaWorld. In January 2014, after a USDA inspection of the San Diego park, 
PETA filed a complaint that led to a USDA citation for several violations of the Animal 
Welfare Act.131 Then, in July, after another report revealed trainers were using zinc oxide to 
cover up sunburns and skin damage on the orca whales at the park, PETA filed another 
                                                          
126  Tim Zimmermann, First Person: How Far Will the Blackfish Effect Go? NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Jan. 13, 2014) 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/01/140113-blackfish-seaworld-killer-whale-orcas/. 
127  “Once PETA began calling attention to Blackfish, support soared, with thousands of people visiting the campaign 
website, SeaWorldOfHurt.com. . . . A month later, PETA’s tweet marking the 30th anniversary of Tilikum’s capture 
from the wild was retweeted more than 4,500 times.” Bonnie McEwan, PETA vs. SeaWorld: The Creative Tactics and 
Tech that Drive PETA’s SeaWorld Campaign, NONPROFIT Q. (June 3, 2014), 
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/policysocial-context/24286-peta-vs-seaworld-the-creative-tactics-and-tech-that-
drive-peta-s-seaworld-campaign.html.  
128  “In 2013, when SeaWorld sponsored a float in Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Parade and the Tournament of Roses Parade 
on New Year’s Day, PETA volunteers stood along the route to protest . . . [an] activist . . . received national media 
coverage when she jumped a barricade while holding a “Boycott SeaWorld” sign at both parades.” Id. Reality star 
Stephen “Steve-O” Gilchrist also caused a media frenzy when he climbed onto a San Diego freeway sign that listed 
Sea World Drive and posted the word “SUCKS” directly over Drive to read “Sea World SUCKS.” Michelle Moons, 
PETA May Be on the Hook for Fines if ‘Jackass’ Steve-O Charged in ‘SeaWorld Sucks’ Stunt, BREITBART NEWS NETWORK 
(Sept. 6, 2014), http://www.breitbart.com/Breitbart-California/2014/09/06/PETA-May-Be-on-the-Hook-for-Fines-If-
Jackass-Steve-O-Charged-in-SeaWorld-Sucks-Stunt. 
129  “In April 2013, when SeaWorld’s stock went public, PETA became a shareholder, giving it the necessary standing to 
offer a resolution at SeaWorld’s annual meeting, calling on the company to create a coastal retirement sanctuary for 
its orcas.” SeaWorld successfully petitioned the Securities and Exchange Commission for permission to ignore the 
resolution. McEwan, supra note 127.  
130  See id. 
131  Melissa Cronin, SeaWorld Slapped With (Another) USDA Complaint Over Animal Abuse Allegations, DODO (Oct. 21, 
2014), https://www.thedodo.com/seaworld-usda-complaint-awa-775350391.html. 
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complaint and requested an investigation.132 Finally, Blackfish spurred the proposal of the 
Orca Welfare and Safety Act (AB 2140) in March 2014, which would eliminate performance-
based entertainment and captive breeding of the whales with an ultimate goal of phasing 
out killer whale captivity in California.133 Most importantly, however, SeaWorld announced 
in November 2015 that its traditional orca shows would be replaced with displays “focused 
on the natural behavior of the whales.”134 March 2016 marked the biggest victory for the 
orcas yet; after years of resistance, SeaWorld faced the music and announced that it would 
end its captive breeding program.135 Sadly, the announcement came on the heels of news 
that Tilikum, the poster child of this liberation campaign, was seriously ill and likely to die 
soon.136 
 
A.  Tilikum in Context 
Although more effectively viewed as one facet in the anti-SeaWorld campaign as a 
whole, the Tilikum litigation is rich with new dimensions of advocacy for Tilikum and other 
captive nonhuman animals, which is where new theoretical expansions of legal personhood 
can be created. It is even arguable that by analyzing Tilikum’s right to a private action under 
the Thirteenth Amendment and his other available legal rights, the court implicitly 
acknowledged his underlying legal personhood.137 Two major points of experimentation 
can be seen in the court’s discussion of the constitutional claims brought and the plaintiff’s 
use of next friend standing in Tilikum. 
Some authorities argue that the Tilikum opinion alludes to raising claims under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, as opposed to the Thirteenth, as a more viable option for legal 
claims in future animal rights-based cases.138 The court noted that the Fourteenth 
Amendment, unlike the Thirteenth Amendment, was open to expansive interpretation and 
it offers due process and equal protection;139 however, these constitutional guarantees do 
                                                          
132  Melissa Cronin, USDA Complaint Filed Over SeaWorld’s Sunburned Orcas, DODO (Jul. 24, 2014), 
https://www.thedodo.com/usda-complaint-filed-over-seaw-641021639.html. 
133  Paul Janes, California Bill Would Ban SeaWorld Orca Shows, USA TODAY (Apr. 8, 2014, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/03/07/san-diego-seaworld-orca-shows/6162331/. 
134  Ameena Schelling, SeaWorld Ending Its Old Orca Show ... And Starting A New One, DODO (Nov. 9, 2015), 
https://www.thedodo.com/seaworld-ending-orca-shows-1446372109.html. 
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explicitly apply to persons—specifically citizens—within the Union.140 Therefore, relying 
on this constitutional provision is even more complicated than relying on the Thirteenth 
Amendment, as neither of these statuses have yet to be applied to orcas or nonhuman 
animals under the law.  
That is not to say, however, that the possibility is completely foreclosed, as Roe v. 
Wade,141 Citizens United,142 and Hobby Lobby143 have proven that personhood is more of an 
artificial and juridical construct—often granted, importantly, for the sake of achieving a 
larger collective or political goal.144 If it can be argued that, regardless of a nonhuman 
animal’s independent ability to suffer injury with legal redress under the law, a human 
advocacy collective has an interest in appropriating juridical personhood to whales and 
other nonhumans, then perhaps nonhuman animals are entitled to legal personhood 
similar to that of corporations. Much like nonhuman animals, corporations (which include 
lobbyist organizations, churches, and large businesses) cannot have a legal presence 
without the conduct of humans who have a stake in promoting the interests of that entity, 
either as a collective of persons or as a persona independent of its components. 
Additionally, securing rights similar to those of corporations for nonhuman animals makes 
sense under the law for the purpose of promoting social, economic, and even moral 
interests without examining the “humanity” of those entities.  
The Fourteenth Amendment has been a major substrate for legal evolution of 
corporate personhood,145 and animal litigants should restructure our conceptions of 
nonhuman animals such that their protection can be secured under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Furthermore, other Amendments lend themselves to broad interpretations 
that could provide protection for animals, like the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment. 146 
 
B. Alternate Routes to Liberation 
Beyond the amendments themselves, authorities have presented additional theories 
and constructions of nonhuman legal personhood recognizable under the Constitution. 
The first is premised upon the autonomy of nonhuman animals and grants them various 
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degrees of equal status under the law as humans of comparable or potentially zero 
autonomy.147 The second considers the grant of legal personhood as a shibboleth to 
animals’ capabilities: it secures negative rights against suffering and delivers due weight to 
the interests of nonhuman animals in the balance of law.148 Both potential theories seem to 
operate with an understanding that future standing of nonhuman animals will depend not 
only on human revocation of presumed superiority over and entitlement to nonhuman 
animals,149 but also on progressive use of already-present and traditional legal tools brought 
through legal guardianship. PETA’s use of next friend status in Tilikum is but one possible 
example where a guardian may sue on behalf of an animal in a similar fashion constructed 
for children and the mentally incompetent.150 As a next friend or guardian ad litem, 
individuals (humans, in this scenario) are supposed to operate in the best interest of their 
ward (animals, in this scenario), who is presumed to lack the ability to determine their best 
interests.151 Additionally, these next friends appointed by the court do not even have to be 
attorneys; they merely must prove that they have the best interests of their ward at heart.152 
Not only has this approach been successful in previous animal rights cases,153 but it is also 
very compatible with the current court system and it honors a sense of the animals’ 
“equitable self-ownership,” meaning that they have independence, autonomy, and interests 
devoid of those of humans.154  
Another route is currently in the works by Steven Wise of the Nonhuman Rights 
Project (NHRP) regarding the use of the common law writ of habeas corpus for simians.155 
This work can be seen in this year’s series of landmark cases from New York for privately-
owned chimps, among them Tommy,156 Kiko,157 Leo, and Hercules.158 The habeas corpus 
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writ, meaning “you should have the body” in Latin,159 is a summons addressed to a 
custodian (usually a prison official) demanding that a prisoner be taken before the court, 
and that the custodian present proof of his authority to detain the prisoner.160 If the 
custodian is acting beyond his or her authority, then the prisoner must be released.161 Any 
aggrieved prisoner, or another person acting on his or her behalf, may petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.162 This “great writ,” as named by Chief Justice Marshall,163 functions to 
preserve freedom from illegal custody of the innocent and to liberate those "imprisoned 
without sufficient cause."164 
Tommy was the first chimpanzee for which the Nonhuman Rights Project filed a 
writ against his owners. In doing so, the Nonhuman Rights Project was requesting that his 
owners, as his custodians, prove they have lawful authority to “detain” Tommy165 and 
consequently requested his release to a sanctuary.166 In December 2014, a three-judge 
appellate division panel ruled unanimously that Tommy’s owner is not obligated to release 
him from what an animal rights’ group has called unlawful detention.167 In its decision, the 
appeals court reiterated the lower court’s findings that chimpanzees, though intelligent, 
are unfit to take on the legal implications of personhood, ruling that, “unlike human beings, 
chimpanzees cannot bear any legal duties, submit to societal responsibilities or be held 
legally accountable for their actions.”168 
At the same time, the NHRP filed a similar writ for Kiko, a chimp owned by a couple 
near Niagara Falls: again, Wise argued that Kiko’s owners had no authority to detain him, 
and he deserved freedom in a sanctuary.169 In argument, the court asked whether moving 
Kiko from one form of captivity to another represented a fundamental improvement in his 
life. Wise responded, “In the place he’s in now, he’s owned property…[at a sanctuary,] they 
would be obligated to respect his autonomy, his self-determination.”170 This argument 
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failed, however, to persuade the appeals court that this shifting of captivities was an 
adequate appeal for freedom, and Kiko’s writ was also denied.171 
Hercules and Leo, however, have made more progress than any of their 
counterparts. In April 2015, the New York Supreme Court heard arguments in a lawsuit the 
Nonhuman Rights Project filed against Stony Brook University asking for the release of two 
chimpanzees involved in research.172 The court granted a writ of habeas corpus for the 
chimps, granting them their day in court to challenge the validity of their captivity.173 Upon 
the issuance of the writ and order to show cause, the university, represented by the 
Attorney General of New York, appeared in court in order to provide a legally sufficient 
reason for detaining Hercules and Leo.174 In July 2015, the judge denied relief for Hercules 
and Leo based on the precedent set before in Tommy’s case; however, the judge noted:  
 
‘Legal personhood’ is not necessarily synonymous with being human … Rather, the 
parameters of legal personhood have been and will continue to be discussed and debated by 
legal theorists, commentators, and courts and will not be focused on semantics or biology, 
even philosophy, but on the proper allocation of rights under the law, asking, in effect, who 
counts under our law.175  
 
The NHRP has appealed the decision and is working to settle the case; in the meantime, 
the university has ended testing on the two chimps, and negotiations now include the 
potential to release the chimps to a sanctuary.176 
These suits, by implying the writ of habeas corpus could be used to challenge the 
keeping of certain animals, suggest that such animals are entitled to the right of legal 
personhood, as the writ can only be applied to legal persons.177 At the very least, these suits 
propose that these animals are legal persons for the purpose of a habeas proceeding where 
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there is a question regarding their freedom to bodily liberty.178 How Hercules and Leo’s suit 
moves forward will have possible implications for orcas like Tilikum in the future.  
The ALDF has also attempted to liberate another orca whale, Lolita, in another 
marine entertainment park using a different litigation scheme. According to a January 2013 
settlement agreement reached after the ALDF, PETA, the Orca Network, and four 
individuals filed a lawsuit against the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) regarding 
Lolita’s unlawful exclusion from the Endangered Species Act (ESA); the agency must now 
either include Lolita in the ESA listing or supply a legal reason to exclude her.179 Her family 
that remains in the wild has already been listed as endangered, as a part of the Pacific 
Northwest’s Southern Resident orca population, where Lolita was captured. 180 Lolita—
captive for more than forty years, one of the longest periods in North America—has 
remained exempt from ESA protection, however.181 In February 2014, however, The 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration agreed to add the forty-nine-year old 
whale to the ESA listing, which could create legal opportunities to request her 
rehabilitation and release into the wild—or to a marine refuge closer to home; it could also 
create a means to more adequately protect Lolita while she remains in captivity.182 
Beyond these possibilities, opportunity lies in legislative efforts to codify provisions 
that create suits where nonhuman animals do have appropriate standing, independent of 
human guardians. For example, Dave Favre’s tort theory that works in next friend suits 
does not displace the legal status of nonhuman animals, but rather targets the right of 
ownership, and can be incorporated into statute.183 In his theory, nonhuman animals have 
“equitable self-ownership,” to the extent that they as plaintiffs may “prevail against anyone 
who harms [their] fundamental interest[s]. . . , if the human defendant’s interests do not 
substantially outweigh [theirs].”184 This theory works to alter enforcement of animal 
legislation without completely undermining the understanding of nonhuman animals as 
property in law. 185 
Obviously, though, new and innovative ways of creating a space for animals in the 
legal landscape are developing every day. These strategies rely both on preexisting 
legislation specific to animals, like the novel use of the ESA seen in Lolita’s case, to 
revolutionary conceptions of ancient common law doctrines like the application of habeas 
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corpus to chimpanzees. These litigation schemes mold new ideas for nonhuman 
personhood onto the legal landscape in ways that implicitly accept concern for other 
species without obscuring other historical legal mechanisms aimed at different 
anthropocentric injustices. Furthermore, these strategies wrestle with questions that the 
animal legal defense movement must wrestle with in the wake of Tilikum: what does it 
mean to say that animals cannot ever be fully recognized and equal to humans under the 
law? What does it mean to be human, legally? How do we know what legal recourse is most 
in line with the desires of non-human animals—or that legal recourse is the right choice at 
all? Will certain gaps always remain between animals and humans in the law, a system 
constructed exclusively for humans and by humans? Furthermore, and most importantly 
here, does creating parallels between animal rights and civil rights undermine the work 
that remains to be done for fellow humans still disadvantaged under the law and within 
our society today? These questions demand answers that negotiate novel forms of legal 
personhood for animals, many of which have yet to be explored or fathomed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 In the past century, there has been gradual expansion in recognition of legal rights 
for formerly oppressed minorities and for animals through the work of their respective 
movements for social change and litigation advocacy. Conceptual connections exist 
between both movements: there was similar discourse on power differentials; similar 
disputes over how to build the movement and over how to frame the problem, the solution, 
and the motivations for participation;186 and similar goals in building positive law from 
normative principles.187 Appropriations of language and tactics between the two 
movements are evident and have been essential to increased mobilization, as is typical in 
intersectional social movements.188 Often, such social justice movements employ ideas of 
morality, sympathy, and justice and attract overlapping concerned audiences. It is no 
surprise, then, that nonhuman rights litigation has moved into the arena formerly reserved 
for enslavement and oppression of humans. These tactics push the boundaries on animal 
liberation, equality, and personhood, as courts attempt to reconcile understandings of 
humans’ moral obligations to nonhumans; this was especially the case in Tilikum, where 
the court affirmed the legal rights of animals, but denied their legal personhood by 
disregarding their standing. Thus, the courts remain reluctant to fully grant fundamental 
legal rights and personhood to nonhumans. This is also seen now in cases like those of the 
                                                          
186  See Wrenn, supra note 36 (“Typical of other social movements…the abolitionist movement was heavily factionalized 
and divided over the use of violence, moral suasion, and legal and religious institutions.”). 
187  See Maddux, supra note 137. 
188  See Wrenn, supra note 36 (“[A]ppropriation is an important mechanism for oppressed or resource-poor 
groups….Marginalized groups might quickly gain a sense of identity and legitimacy in drawing on other 
movements….[It] also represents the interactive nature of social movements, which exist in a dynamic relation with 
one another, a reality that is also often ignored in traditional models.”). 
Indiana Journal of Law & Social Equality  Volume 4, Issue 2 
192 
chimpanzees in New York, where a developing sense of justice for animals compels courts 
to question the desire of these nonhuman captives and the adequacy of remedies for the 
alleged harms they experience. 
 The Thirteenth Amendment changes the legal status of an entire tract of the 
population from property to persons. The provision was inconceivable at the time, with 
slavery’s vast economic benefits to those in power as well as society as a whole, not to 
mention the fundamental perceptions of slaves as nonhuman. Because abolition was 
merely expanding rights to other previously unrecognized humans, the “dreaded 
comparison” of Tilikum to black slaves is often met with outrage and disbelief, and the 
Tilikum litigation is considered more of an impact statement. Animals, under the law, seem 
to have a long way to go before they are viewed as more than property. However, the 
abolitionist and civil rights movements prove the power of social, political and legal efforts 
to alter social understandings and recognize the humanity of former slaves. In turn, Tilikum 
proves that, little by little, the movement is seeking out the weaknesses in the “immutable” 
belief that nonhuman animals lack rights or personhood. Social discourse continues to 
condemn human-inflicted suffering, whether directed at other humans or at nonhuman 
animals.189 It also challenges how we as humans understand our humanity: what does it 
mean to suffer, to think, to desire? How does the law accommodate these notions? Why?  
Future animal rights litigation strategies should continue to push for new, creative 
conceptions of fundamental legal rights and principles, and to carve out the deeper notions 
of personhood and humanity under the law. While the historical moorings of the 
Thirteenth Amendment establish the limit of overlapping movements towards social 
justice and reduction of suffering, there remain other avenues to creatively excoriate the 
specieist hierarchy between animals and humans, and to create a niche of justiciable 
protection for nonhuman species. Tilikum and all of the other captive orcas deserve a more 
appropriate legal position in the law reflective of our inherent disdain for exploitation and 
domination of the weak. 
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